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NOTES
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
UNITED STATES GRAY MARKET:
THE COMMON-CONTROL
EXCEPTION SURVIVES, FOR NOW
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc'
I. INTRODUCTION
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,2 the United States Supreme Court
recently decided that the Customs Service may continue to allow entry
into the United States of gray-market imports where the foreign manu-
facturer and domestic trademark owner are subject to common control.
The Court also prohibited importation of gray-market goods in cases
where the trademark is applied to the foreign goods merely with the
authorization of the United States trademark owner. The decision was
an attempt to settle a conflict between federal circuit courts of appeal
over the legality of gray-market importation.
A gray market generally arises when merchandise produced and sold
abroad bearing a genuine3 United States trademark is imported into the
United States and sold in competition with the United States trademark
owner.4 The size of the United States gray market has been estimated at
1. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (together with 47th Street Photo, Inc. v. Coalition to
Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, No. 86-624, and United States v. Coalition
to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks, No. 86-625, also on certiorari to the
same court).
2. Id.
3. The trademark is described as "genuine" to distinguish it from a "counterfeit"
trademark. A "genuine" trademark accurately indicates the source of the goods. Counterfeit
marks copy and confuse. The Lanham Trademark Act defines a "counterfeit" mark as
a "spurious mark Nwch is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered
mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). See generally 2 J. McCARTHY, TRADE R.s AND UNFAm
CompEmroN § 30.34 (2d ed. 1984).
4. See id. § 30.35; see also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1985), cet. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
1
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greater than six billion dollars a year.5 The- genus of these parallel imports
over the last hundred years has ranged from mineral water6 to Caterpillar
excavators.
7
A trademark is recognized as a symbol of the good will which a
business has established over time.8 Trademark owners contend that gray-
market importers are "obtaining a free ride which will eventually destroy"
the good will established by the trademark owner.9 The "free ride" results
from the importers' profiting from the public's recognition of the trade-
mark and the advertising effort of the domestic trademark owner. The
gray marketeer also misleads consumers to believe the goods are warranted
by the domestic firm.'0 Both the consumer and the trademark owner's
good will are damaged when the holder of a defective gray-market product
discovers that, because the import and sale were not authorized by the
trademark owner, his warranty does not cover the product." Because the
gray market is a substitution of imports for domestic goods, it also
contributes to the trade deficit. 12 Those who support parallel importation,
on the other hand, oppose restraints on the influx of gray-market goods
because, they contend, there "is no reason to pay unreasonable prices
to the manufacturer's United States distributor when you can obtain
exactly the same products at lower prices overseas."' 3
II. KATZEL TO COPIAT: TIE GRAY MARKET, CUSTOMS AND THE
COURTS
The first statutory attempt to directly confront the gray market was
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922.' 4 Congressional enactment of section
526 came on the heels of a Second Circuit holding that parallel importation
of genuine trademarked goods is lawful. 5 The plaintiff in Katzel had
bought the United States trademark rights for a facial powder from a
French company and registered the trademark in its own name with the
5. Boyer, The Assault on the Right to Buy Cheap Imports, FORTUNE, Jan. 7,
1985, at 89.
6. Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
7. Goodgame, Inside the Gray Market, TME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 76.
8. 1 J. Mcm i, TRADEMARm s AND UNFAIm CompETTON § 2.10 (2d ed. 1984).
9. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556.
10. Boyer, supra note 5, at 89.
11. Goodgame, supra note 7, at 76.
12. 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 709 (1988).
13. Goodgame, supra note 7, at 76 (quoting Robert Stevenson, Vice President of
K Mart Corp.).
14. Ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (1922) (reenacted as § 526(a) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, currently 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)).
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Patent and Trademark Office. 16 The defendant imported and sold similarly
trademarked face powder made by the same French firm.1 7 In refusing
to enjoin such importation and sale, the court reasoned that no infringe-
ment existed because the powder was genuine, that is, manufactured by
the firm which the trademark indicated. 8 Congress responded to Katzel
with the enactment of section 526.19
Section 526 of the Tariff Act, as originally enacted in 1922, remains
unchanged today and does not provide for exceptions to its ban on
parallel importation. 20 The Customs Service regulation promulgating sec-
tion 526, however, included common-control and authorized-use exceptions
which allowed the importation of gray-market goods depending on the
relationship between the foreign manufacturer and domestic trademark
owner.
21
In recent years courts have struggled with the Customs Service's
interpretation. In Vivitar Corp. v. United States,22 Vivitar, owner of a
registered United States trademark as applied to photographic equipment,
16. Id. at 539.
17. Id. at 540.
18. Id. at 543. The Supreme Court reversed, without reference to section 526,
holding that there was infringement because the pubic understood the powder to come
from the plaintiff, even though not made by the plaintiff. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v.
Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
19. Senator McCumber, one of the bill's sponsors, stated that "[a]s shown, the
courts have held that we cannot prevent any product being shipped into the United States
if it is in violation of a trade-mark where the foreign maker has sold trade-mark and all,
patent and everything, in the United States." 62 CoNG. REc. 11,604 (1922).
20. Ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (1922). This was reenacted as § 526(a) of
the Tariff Act of 1930, currently 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982), which provides, in part:
(a) it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
United States and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person
domiciled in the United States ... unless written consent of the owner of such
trademark is produced at the time of making entry.
21. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1987) provides in part:
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign made articles bearing a trademark identical with
one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or
association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure
and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are
parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common
ownership or control (see §§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
22. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
1989]
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sought to have the Customs Service refuse entry of goods bearing its
trademark without its consent. 23 Vivitar argued that the Customs Service
regulation was unlawful and contrary to section 526.24 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in affirming the Court of International
Trade,25 concluded that the regulation was merely the agency's deter-
mination of what goods will automatically be refused entry into the United
States. 26 The regulation, according to the court, did not determine Vivitar's
rights under the Tariff Act, and therefore Vivitar could seek a declaration
in federal district court directing the Customs Service to exclude the
parallel imports.27
While Vivitar was losing its case in the Federal Circuit, Olympus
Corporation was challenging the same regulation in the Second Circuit. 28
Olympus, like Vivitar, was the owner and registrant of its namesake as
a United States trademark applied to photographic equipment. 29 Olympus'
complaint also alleged that the Customs Service regulation was inconsistent
with the Tariff Act.3 0 The district court held,3 the court of appeals
affirmed,32 that the agency interpretation of the statute was valid. The
court echoed Vivitar33 and stated that despite this holding, the trademark
holder may still have rights against the importer under the Tariff Act.' 4
The Customs Service regulation was merely a choice, based on consid-
eration of administrative burden, not to exclude certain gray-market goods. 3
Consideration of the administrative burden, however, as the dissent
convincingly pointed out, compels a contrary conclusion.36 Under its
interpretation, Customs must determine the nature of the underlying
relationship, if any, between the importer and the United States trademark
owner before deciding whether to exclude the goods. Different relationships
will require different results upon entry at Customs.37 If the agency were
23. Id. at 1555.
24. Id. at 1568-69.
25. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
26. V'vitar, 761 F.2d at 1569-70.
27. Id. at 1570.
28. Olympus Corp v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
29. Id. at 913.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 922.
32. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
33. 761 F.2d at 1570.
34. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 322.
37. The Supreme Court discussed five such relationships in K Mart: Importer-
independent domestic purchaser of trademark rights, foreign parent-domestic subsidiary,
domestic parent-foreign subsidiary, domestic firm-foreign manufacturing division, and do-
mestic firm-foreign firm authorized to use the United States trademark abroad. K Mart,
108 S. Ct. at 1812.
[Vol. 54
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to enforce the trademark holder's rights, which the Olympus majority
conceded to exist,38 it would automatically refuse entry to goods bearing
American trademarks. It would not be necessary to inquire whether any
affiliation exists between the foreign manufacturer and the domestic trade-
mark owner. The burden would then be on the potential importer to
produce written consent from the trademark owner to import the goods,
as specifically provided for in the Tariff Act.39
In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (CO-
PIAT) v. United States,40 the plaintiffs, an alliance of manufacturers and
distributors of trademarked goods, sued the Commissioner of Customs,
the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States seeking an order
directing the Customs Service to ban the importation of gray-market
good. 41 K Mart Corporation and 47th Street Photo, opposed to any ban
on parallel imports, intervened as defendants. 42
K Mart operates over 2,000 discount stores retailing a variety of gray-
market goods while 47th Street Photo sells gray-market electronic equip-
ment in New York City.43 Licensed foreign subsidiaries manufactured
goods bearing the plaintiffs' trademarks. 4 The plaintiffs claimed to suffer
damage when parties other than the foreign affiliates bought the trade-
marked goods abroad, imported them into the United States, and sold
them in direct competition with the plaintiffs. 4 COPIAT argued that the
Customs Service regulation, 46 which allowed parallel importation in some
instances, was inconsistent with the Tariff Act of 193047 and section 42
of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946.48 The district court held that
section 42 of the Lanham Act 49 was inapplicable in that it only prohibits
importation of counterfeit0 trademarked goods." The court further held
38. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) provides that importation of goods bearing a registered
United States trademark are prohibited "unless written consent of the owner of such
trademark is produced at the time of making entry."
40. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
41. Id. at 846.
42. Id. K Mart and 47th Street Photo also intervened in Olympus, 627 F. Supp.
at 916. 47th Street Photo intervened in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1415,




46. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1987). For the pertinent text of the regulation, see supra
note 21.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982). For the text of the Act, see supra note 20.
48. COPL4T, 598 F. Supp. at 846.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1980). The Act provides in part that "no article of imported
merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of ... any domestic manufacture or
manufacturer ... shall be admitted to entry .... "
50. For an explanation of the difference between genuine and counterfeit trademarked
goods, see supra note 3.
51. COPL4T, 598 F. Supp. at 848. Claims under this section of the Lanham Act
1989]
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for the defendants that the Customs Service regulation was not inconsistent
with the Tariff Act.5 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the district court and held that the regulatory exceptions to the
gray-market ban were unlawful.53 With that holding, the regulation became
simultaneously valid in the Federal Circuit under Vivitar, valid pending
appeal in the Second Circuit under Olympus, and invalid in the District
of Columbia Circuit under COPIAT.
III. THE K ,MART DECISION: GRAY SKIES FOR UNITED STATES
TRADEMARK OWNERS
COPIAT was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and
ultimately decided as K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.14 The Court decided
whether the federal regulation that permitted gray-market importation
under certain circumstances was a reasonable agency interpretation of
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 51 A majority 6 of the Court reversed
the court of appeals and upheld the common-control exception57 of the
Customs Service regulation.58 A different majority59 affirmed the court
of appeals and held that the authorized-use exception 6 was inconsistent
with section 526.
The Court in K Mart analyzed the Customs Service regulation by
considering how it dealt with the various situations in which a gray-
market exists. 6' The first situation [hereinafter case 1] arises when an
American firm purchases the rights to use a foreign firm's trademark
and registers it with the Patent and Trademark Office.62 This American
firm then becomes a gray-market victim when the foreign firm or third
parties import goods bearing the same trademark and sell them in direct
were also raised unsuccessfully in Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1415, 1419
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), and Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 921-22
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
52. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 851.
53. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. K-Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 188 (1988). Because the court of appeals found the
regulation invalid in view of the Tariff Act, it did not need to consider whether it also
violated the Lanham Act. Id. at 907.
54. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
55. Id. at 1814.
56. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and Kennedy.
57. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1987).
58. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817.
59. The Chief Justice, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy.
60. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1987).
61. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1814-15.
62. Id. at 1814.
[Vol. 54
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competition with the domestic firm. 63 Another parallel import context
[hereinafter case 2] considered by the Court arises when the domestic
holder of the registered trademark is affiliated with the foreign manu-
facturer who is the source of the gray-market goods." As in case 1, the
foreign manufacturer or third parties import the goods into the U.S.
market. The Court examined three variations in the nature of the affiliation
in this context: foreign parent-domestic subsidiary (case 2a), domestic
parent-foreign subsidiary (case 2b), and foreign division of a domestic
firm (case 2c). Yet another gray-market situation [hereinafter case 3] exists
when a domestic firm authorizes an unaffiliated foreign firm to use the
former's trademark abroad. 65 Again, the foreign firm or third parties
import the goods into the U.S. market.
The entire Court agreed that section 526 of the Tariff Act prohibited
parallel importation of trademarked goods in the case 1 context, where
an American firm purchased the rights to use the foreign firm's trademark
in the United States. 66 Allowing this gray market to exist effectively would
deprive the domestic firm of full enjoyment of its investment. Justice
Scalia pointed out, however, that by allowing the common-control ex-
ception to stand, the majority denied case 1 trademark holders protection.67
He indicated that an independent American firm that had purchased
exclusive rights to use and register a foreign firm's trademark in the
United States was helpless to prevent importation of goods manufactured
by another American firm that had purchased the same trademark rights
in another country. 6" By upholding the common-control exception, the
majority would seemingly allow an affiliation of this variety to produce
a case 1 victim.
Though section 526 prohibited importation of goods "of foreign
manufacture" that bear a United States trademark, 69 the majority con-
cluded that this did not include such goods manufactured abroad by a
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1815.
65. Id.
66. The Court stated that " Of the foreign manufacturer could import the trademarked
goods and distribute them here, despite having sold the trademark to a domestic firm, the
domestic firm would be forced into sharp intrabrand competition involving the very trademark
it purchased." Id. The Court further stated:
There is no dispute that § 526 protects the trademnark holder in the first of the
three gray-market contexts identified by the Court - the prototypical gray-market
situation in which a domestic firm purchases from an independent foreign firm
the rights to register and use in the United States a foreign trademark (case 1).
Id. at 1820.
67. Id. at 1832.
68. Id.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1983). See supra note 20.
19891
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domestic company's affiliate.7 0 A Chrysler built in Taiwan would not be
considered a foreign car, and one could therefore buy such cars off a
lot in Taipei and import them into the United States notwithstanding
protestations from Chrysler or its distributors.
Justice Kennedy concluded that "owned by' 17 in section 526 was
ambiguous when applied to the case 2a situation involving a foreign parent
and domestic subsidiary.7 2 The Customs Service could therefore reasonably
determine that a trademark held by a domestic subsidiary was in fact
"owned by" the foreign parent . 7 The agency was entitled to except goods
bearing this trademark from the importation ban, since foreign firms are
not entitled to the protection of section 526.74 Justice Kennedy found no
conflict between the regulation and the statute in the foreign parent-
domestic subsidiary context.7 5
Justice Brennan, writing for the rest of the majority that upheld the
common control exception,7 6 stated that Congress did not intend to protect
a case 2a foreign parent against parallel importation and therefore the
Customs Service may reasonably except these goods from exclusion. 7
These Justices overlooked the fact that Customs need not create a broad
common-control exception to exclude foreign parent companies from the
protection of the Tariff Act. Customs could still allow the goods to enter
because a foreign parent could be considered to "own" the assets, in-
cluding the trademark, of its American subsidiary. Therefore, a foreign
company that set up a shell subsidiary in the United States only to register
the trademark could still be denied the protection of section 526 because
the trademark would not be "owned by" the American firm, but by its
foreign parent. This operation of the Tariff Act would be consistent with
the legislative intent as the majority saw it, namely, to deny protection
to foreign interests. Most importantly, the agency could further this intent
without use of the overbroad common-control exception because it could
find authority to deny protection in the Tariff Act.
Justice Scalia, with the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor, agreed with Justice Kennedy that "owned by" in the statute
70. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1818. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice White stated
that "the agency is entitled to choose any reasonable definition and to interpret the statute
to say that goods manufactured by a foreign subsidiary or division of a domestic company
are not goods 'of foreign manufacture.' " Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens stated that "[s]urely a domestic firm that establishes a manufacturing facility
abroad (case 2c) is not in any sense a foreigner, and it is at the very least reasonable to
view as 'American' the foreign subsidiary of a domestic firm [case 2b]." Id. at 1821.
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.




76. Section 133.21(c)(1)-(2); see supra note 20.
77. Id. at 1820-21.
[Vol. 54
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was sufficiently ambiguous so that the agency may deny foreign parent
companies the protection of the statute.78 Nonetheless, these Justices would
invalidate the sections of the agency regulation creating the common-
control exception in that they unjustifiably exclude trademarked products
in the case 2b (domestic parent-foreign subsidiary) and case 2c (domestic
firm-foreign manufacturing division) situations from section 526's pro-
hibition. 79 A problem arose, however, because the regulation's broad
clauses granted entry to case 2a, 2b and 2c imports,80 thereby allowing
case 2b and 2c imports over the statute's ban. Justice Scalia asserted that
the trademarks in case 2b and 2c were unambiguously "owned by"
domestic firms and therefore imports bearing these trademarks were ex-
pressly covered by the statute.8 The common-control exception as it exists,
however, freely allows entry of these goods.
But the majority upheld the common-control exception as it related
to cases 2b and 2c on the grounds that "of foreign manufacture" in
section 526 may be interpreted so as not to include goods manufactured
by a foreign subsidiary or division of an American company.
8 2
The Court also relied on an inferred congressional intent not to extend
import prohibition to affiliates of foreign manufacturers.83 Justice Brennan
stated that case 2 victims do not need the prohibition of section 526
because they have more control over the trademark.84 Yet the remedies
that Brennan suggested are either impractical or, as Justice Scalia pointed
out, ignore the reality that it is not the foreign affiliates, but third parties,
that are doing the damage.85 Justice Brennan's first proposition,86 that
the affiliates stipulate that the foreign entity will not import the goods
to anyone other than its domestic counterpart, does not address third
party importation. His second suggestion, 7 that restrictions on the articles'
resale be imposed, is of questionable legality and enforceability. His final
proposition was that sales abroad be curtailed entirely.8 8 In light of the
Tariff Act's solution to the gray-market problem at the point of entry,
the most efficient chokepoint, it is absurd to ask United States companies
to forego lucrative foreign markets because Customs Service and the
courts refuse to enforce the Tariff Act.
78. Id. at 1831.
79. Id.
80. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(l)-(2) (1987). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
81. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1831.
82. Id. at 1818-19.
83. Id. at 1822.
84. Id. at 1823.
85. Id. at 1836.
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Where gray-market goods are actually imported by the foreign sub-
sidiary or division, and the foreign and domestic entities are actually
under common-control, the foreign importer could get consent from its
domestic counterpart and the goods would be admitted as specifically
allowed by the Tariff Act. The Customs Service, therefore, does not need
the common-control exception to admit goods where the foreign and
domestic firms are actually working together to provide imports.
The Court struck down the authorized-use exception of the Customs
Service regulation as contrary to the statute.89 It deemed the section to
deprive a domestic trademark holder of the statute's protection in a
context unaffected by the perceived ambiguities of "owned by" and "of
foreign manufacture." 90 The Court decided, therefore, that a United States
trademark holder may exclude gray-market imports in the case 3 situation,
i.e. where the domestic firm has authorized the use of the trademark
abroad by an independent foreign firm. 9'
The Supreme Court's validation in K Mart of the common-control
exception leaves domestic trademark owners unprotected against goods
manufactured by a foreign affiliate which eventually make their way into
the gray market. The decision even denies the protection of the Tariff
Act when the gray marketeer is a third party unrelated to the United
States trademark owner or its foreign affiliate.
IV. THE TRADEMARKc PROTECTION ACT OF 1988
In response to KMart, on October 14, 1988, Senators Hatch, DeConcini,
Bradley and Mikulski introduced the Trademark Protection Act of 1988
"to take into account the recent Supreme Court decision ...."92 This
proposed amendment to the Lanham Trademark Act expressly forbids
importation of "any good that is manufactured outside the United States
if such good ... bears a trademark that is identical to a trademark . ..
owned by a person that is a citizen of the United States or by a corporation
or other entity created within the United States ... registered by such
person with the Patent and Trademark Office . . . -91 The proposal does
not contain the ambiguity "of foreign manufacturer" as does the Tariff
Act and further states that the restrictions apply regardless of any af-
filiation the trademark owner has with foreign entities. 94
89. Id. at 1819.
90. Id. at 1818-19.
91. Id.
92. 134 CoNG. REc. S16,095 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).








The proposed Trademark Protection Act should be received favorably
by Congress. It directly addresses the problems the gray market poses
for consumers and United States trademark owners. Such goods may not
meet quality standards imposed on goods made for sale in the United
States.9 This can result in hazardous situations when the goods are, for
example, foods, pharmaceuticals or cosmetics.9 6 The goods may also lack
manufacturers' warranties because their import and sale are not authorized
by the manufacturer." A thriving gray market also contributes to the
trade deficit.98 The gray-market importer profits substantially from the
consumer acceptance and good will that the trademark owner has estab-
lished in this country. 99 Because the Customs Service and the judiciary
have expressed an unwillingness to use the Tariff Act to protect consumers
and trademark owners from these dangers of the gray market, enactment
of the Trademark Protection Act is essential.
PAUL I. J. FLEIsCIUT
95. 134 CONG. Rnc. S16,096 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
96. Id.
97. Id. See also Boyer, supra note 5, at 89.
98. 134 CONG. REc. S16,096 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988); 36 PAT. TRADmARI &
CopYiuanr J. (BNA) 709 (1988).
99. 134 CONG. REc. S16,096 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d at 1552, 1556 (3d Cir. 1985).
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